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Article 
Ancient Worries and Modern Fears: Different Roots 
and Common Effects of U.S. and E.U. Privacy 
Regulation 
PIERLUIGI PERRI AND DAVID THAW 
Much legal and technical scholarship discusses the differing views of the 
United States and European Union toward privacy concepts and regulation. A 
substantial amount of effort in recent years, in both research and policy, focuses on 
attempting to reconcile these viewpoints searching for a common framework with a 
common level of protection for citizens from both sides of Atlantic. Reconciliation, 
we argue, misunderstands the nature of the challenge facing effective cross-border 
data flows. No such reconciliation can usually occur without abdication of some 
sovereign authority of nations, which would require the adoption of an international 
agreement with typical tools of international law. In this Article, we explore an 
alternative means to achieve effective data interchange governance among the 
Western nations, arguing that the focus for addressing privacy issues created in 
cross-border data flows should instead be procedural, rather than substantive. 
Beginning with the observation that both U.S. and E.U. cultures share a 
common fear of “chilling effects” infringing various rights to privacy, we link the 
differences in privacy fears to the comparative views of the role of the state. These 
differences are instructive in that while they limit the potential for substantive 
harmonization of privacy goals, they also create substantial opportunity for 
procedural harmonization.  
Such procedural harmonization would afford many benefits, reducing 
transaction costs for multi-national organizations and increasing the probability 
that individuals can express (and rely upon implementation) of their privacy 
preferences The result is a system we describe as Market-Supervised Regulatory 
Delegation, in which the substantive differences among nations can be respected 
and implemented in an international market for expressing privacy preferences that 
is not distorted by the overhead of competing compliance regimes. 
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Ancient Worries and Modern Fears: Different Roots 
and Common Effects of U.S. and E.U. Privacy 
Regulation 
PIERLUIGI PERRI AND DAVID THAW * 
INTRODUCTION 
The idea that the U.S. and E.U. have different perceptions about privacy 
values is widespread. When describing the U.S. view, much scholarship 
starts from Warren and Brandeis’ Article, The Right to Privacy, which 
presents a view of “the right to be let alone” very different from common 
European perception of privacy.1 This focus on substantive difference, 
however, overlooks other differences that may explain why these two 
contemporary western cultures developed such different views of the right 
to privacy. This Article compares the differing perceptions of privacy 
through the lens of causation, tracing those perceptions’ roots along with the 
development of the administrative state in each region. The privacy 
“worries” resulting from violations of the two different perceptions are, in 
fact, quite similar in quality and differ not in the resultant fear but rather in 
the respective societies’ views of the role of regulation. 
Contemporary examinations of privacy law in the United States and the 
European Union focus predominantly on the substantial differences between 
these regulatory regimes and the strength of protection they afford. This 
comparative view correctly describes the different actors with which each 
regime’s privacy protections are concerned: the U.S. regime fears intrusions 
by the State, whereas the E.U. regime fears intrusions by private 
corporations, especially so-called Big Data corporations. The traditional 
view, however, is incomplete because it overlooks a critical commonality 
between the two regimes—the shared fear of what bad actions the “privacy 
                                                                                                                          
* Pierluigi Perri is an Associate Research Professor of Advanced Computer Law at Università degli 
Studi di Milano (University of Milan). David Thaw is an Assistant Professor of Law and Information 
Sciences at the University of Pittsburgh. Both authors are Affiliated Fellows of the Information Society 
Project at Yale Law School, and their names are listed in alphabetical order. This Article has been 
produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of this Article are the sole 
responsibility of Pierluigi Perri and David Thaw, and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the 
European Union. The authors are grateful for the support of The European Studies Center at the 
University of Pittsburgh, a Jean Monnet Center of Excellence. The authors also thank the Università degli 
Studi di Milano for its support of this work. This Article benefitted from the thoughtful commentary of 
Jack Balkin and Guido Calabresi. 
1 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193, 
206 (1890) (describing the evolution of recognized personal rights, particularly, the “right to be let 
alone”). 
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intruder” will take. Specifically, while each regime fears different actors—
both are concerned about the “chilling effects” on individual freedoms that 
would result from privacy invasions. 
The common values inherent in both United States and European Union 
privacy regulation, and in their associated bureaucratic institutions, provide 
clues to developing a framework for coordinating these two different 
regulatory regimes. Such coordination has many benefits for international 
data flow, which has become a fact of modern life. Multi-national 
organizations, for example, handle vast amounts of data and compliance 
with different regulatory procedures can be highly inefficient. The 
application of Management-Based Regulatory Delegation theory, or  
“Federated Regulation,” can allow individual states to maintain their 
autonomy with respect to substantive privacy values while reducing 
compliance costs by coordinating procedural regulatory processes. Such an 
approach is possible because of the common shared fear among U.S. and 
E.U. States—that privacy invasions, regardless of their source, will 
ultimately lead to chilling effects on individual action.  
The resultant approach, which we describe as Supervised Market-Based 
Regulation, allows for an international regulatory framework which both 
shows respect for national differences in privacy preferences while allowing 
for harmonized compliance procedures which reduce barriers to free flow of 
information and discourage compliance-avoidance activities. 
I. DIFFERENT ORIGINS OF U.S. AND E.U. FEDERALISM AS CAUSES OF 
DIFFERENT PERCEPTION OF PRIVACY VALUE  
This Section explores the different ways in which the federalist systems 
of the U.S. and E.U. affect perceptions of privacy. Views of the State as 
instrumentalist in Europe (fearing unrestrained private action) and views of 
the State as self-limiting in the U.S. (fearing unrestrained state action) accord 
with the classic fears each society's government seeks to restrain. These 
views still predominate modern political discourse and, we argue, translate 
into modern conceptions of the role of privacy regulation in the two 
respective societies.  
U.S. political discourse focuses far more on concerns regarding privacy 
intrusions by state actions than it does on privacy intrusions by private 
corporations. E.U. political discourse, by contrast, focuses far more on 
privacy intrusions by private corporations than does U.S. political discourse. 
Furthermore, notwithstanding substantial political disagreement among U.S. 
states and regions, and among E.U. member states, the two comparative 
dimensions described above are among the few aspects of privacy about 
which there is agreement within each respective culture. U.S. states and 
regions generally agree that unrestrained federal power threatens privacy, 
and E.U. members states generally agree that unrestrained capitalism 
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threatens privacy.2 
In this regard, the U.S. and E.U. irreconcilably differ as to who are the 
“feared privacy invader(s).” U.S. culture “fears” government invasion and 
specifically protects against it,3 looking to the private market as an 
instrument to protect privacy choices. E.U. culture “fears” invasions by 
private corporations (sometimes referred to as “imported capitalism” 
especially as respects U.S. technology companies) and looks to Data 
Protection Authorities as instruments to issue guidelines or even binding 
regulation that protect privacy choices4. 
These irreconcilable differences make substantive convergence between 
U.S. and E.U. privacy regulation deeply problematic. Even if recent 
responses by E.U. governments to national security and terrorism events 
were to raise fears of privacy invasion by national governments, as some 
have recently observed,5 such a choice would do little to suppress fears of 
private corporate action. The fundamental difference regarding the 
instrumentalities of preference expression and free-choice preservation 
would remain.6 
Curiously, however, each of these two societies shares a common fear—
the result that will manifest as consequence of failing to protect against 
violations of individuals’ privacy. Each society shares the belief that privacy 
invasions, or perhaps more importantly perceptions of risk of privacy 
invasions, will deter individual action and expression creating the 
normalizing effects predicted by Foucault.7 A particularly salient example 
of this shared fear is highlighted by responses on both sides of the Atlantic 
                                                                                                                          
2 Such a distinction is not unsurprising, particularly in the privacy context, considering the social 
and historical roots of American and European societies as placing greater value on “individualism” and 
“order and rank” respectively. William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 
959, 965–966 (2016). 
3 E.g., U.S. Const, amend. IV; William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment. Origins and Original 
Meaning, OXFORD UNIV. PRESS. (2009). See also, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2494–95 
(2014); see also generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
4 Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy in Europe: Initial Data on Governance 
Choices and Corporate Practices, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1529, 1644–1648 (2013); Francesca Bignami, 
Cooperative Legalism and the Non-Americanization of European Regulatory Styles: The Case of Data 
Privacy, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 2, 441–457 (2011). 
5 See The Terrorist in the Data, ECONOMIST (Nov. 26, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21679266-how-balance-security-privacy-after-paris-attacks-
terrorist-data (discussing digital privacy concerns following the implementation of new security 
programs after the Paris attacks). 
6 It is important to note that the distinction drawn here, and throughout this Article, is not that 
European citizens are unconcerned with State-based privacy intrusions. Quite the opposite: after World 
War II, many (now) EU nations implemented specific safeguards against such intrusions in their 
respective codes. Rather, instead, what we distinguish here is the current primary focus of unaddressed 
(or under addressed) privacy concerns of the respective polities in contemporary society. 
7 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 200–01 (Alan 
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (exploring a hypothetical society where public perception 
of “permanent visibility . . . assures the automatic functioning of power”). 
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in recent years to bulk data collection through classified government 
surveillance programs.8 This shared concept of “chilling effects”9 gives hope 
that while substantive convergence in transatlantic privacy regulation is 
unlikely, perhaps these limited shared values might facilitate procedural 
harmonization in privacy regulation. 
It is useful, at this point, to briefly trace the histories of the 
administrative states in the U.S. and the E.U., focusing on their respective 
fears of unrestrained state action and unrestrained “imported capitalism,” 
and then examine how the commonalities within the respective regulatory 
systems make possible a form of procedural harmonization when viewed 
from the perspective of the shared desire to prevent chilling effects on 
individual action. 
A. Briefly about the Administrative State in the United States and the 
regulation of privacy 
The concept of the administrative state—if contemplated at all by the 
Framers during the Constitutional Convention—was at most a side thought 
viewed as wholly manageable by a single Chief Executive.10 What was 
clearly at the forefront of the Framers' concerns was a deep-seeded fear of 
the encroachment of individuals' freedoms by the State. This fear was 
evident in the references to substantial dissatisfaction with and concern 
about the arbitrariness of the British monarchic system.11 
In forming the new Republic, the Framers’ fear of state privacy invasion 
was also evident in debates regarding the division of power between the 
federal and state governments. While reservation of the power to state 
governments might be interpreted as not fearful of governmental abuse, both 
historical argument and structural analysis suggest otherwise. First, as a 
structural matter, the giving over of power to a national government was a 
more lasting and difficult-to-alter proposition for the citizens of the late 
1700s than was maintaining their individual state governments. John 
DeWitt's Letter of October 27, 1787 calls for caution and notes that the 
powers of that new government will not be reconstituted annually, but are 
designed to endure perpetually and thus calls upon his fellow citizens to 
                                                                                                                          
8 See Francesca Bignami, European Versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy Analysis of 
Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C.L. REV. 609, 680 (2007). 
9 See Yoan Hermstrüwer & Stephan Dickert, Tearing the Veil of Privacy Law: An Experiment on 
Chilling Effects and the Right to Be Forgotten, MPI COLLECTIVE GOODS PREPRINT, No. 2013/15 (2013). 
10 See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—
A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 492–93 (1987) (“If in 1787 such a merger of 
[governmental powers and] functions was unthinkable, in 1987 it is unavoidable given Congress’s need 
to delegate at some level the making of policy . . . .”). 
11 See RALPH KETCHMAN, THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION DEBATES 1–6 (1986) (discussing the Framers’ dissatisfaction with the British monarchy 
and attempts to form a better government). 
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exercise great care in considering its adoption.12 In particular, DeWitt notes 
“[t]hat insatiable thirst for unconditional control over our fellow creatures . 
. . produced the first Bill of Rights ever prefixed to a Frame of 
Government.”13 The position DeWitt represents, however, did not view the 
Bill of Rights as a complete solution: 
The people, although fully sensible that they reserved every 
title of power that they did not expressly grant away, yet afraid 
that the words made use of, to express those rights so granted 
might convey more than originally intended, they chose at the 
same moment to express in different language those rights 
which the agreement did not include, and which they never 
designed to part with, endeavoring thereby to prevent any 
cause for future altercation and the intrusion into society of 
that doctrine of tacit implication which has been the favorite 
theme of every tyrant from the origin of all governments to the 
present day.14 
This language so aptly conveys the fears of many at the time—that the 
greatest threat of intrusion into individuals’ personal lives was the 
government, and that it was viewed not primarily as an instrumentality to 
achieve ends, but rather this purpose was secondary and government's power 
a necessary evil to provide for certain other common goods, such as national 
defense and international trade. 
In their well-known casebook Administrative Law and Regulatory 
Policy, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer and Professors Stewart, 
Sunstein, Vermeule, and Herz provide a compelling overview of the 
development of the administrative state in the United States.15 Their 
overview provides insight into the U.S. view as fearful of the state and 
placing greater trust in free markets to regulate activity rather than viewing 
the state as an instrument to limit the encroachment of individual freedoms 
by market actors. They divide this overview into temporal periods, which 
can be summarized in five transitions: (1) English antecedents and the 
American experience to 1875; (2) 1875–1930: the rise of regulation and the 
traditional model of administrative law; (3) the New Deal through 1965: the 
Administrative Procedure Act & the maturation of the traditional model of 
administrative law; (4) 1965–1985: critique and transformation of the 
administrative process; and (5) 1985–present: retreat or consolidation (the 
modern period).16 
                                                                                                                          
12 Id. at 194. 
13 Id. at 196. 
14 Id. at 196–97 (emphasis added). 
15 STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & REGULATORY POLICY 15–29 (7th ed. 
2011). 
16 Id. at 15–29. 
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From the earliest days of the Republic until the present day, a consistent 
theme is present of reacting with hesitant and concern to expansion of the 
administrative state. In addition to the discussion above, Breyer's 
observations about the early periods highlight key quotes from The 
Federalist: 
In framing a government which is to be administered by men 
over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable 
the government to control the governed; and in the next place 
oblige it to control itself.17 
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and 
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, 
and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly 
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. . . . On the 
slightest view of the British Constitution, we must perceive 
that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are 
by no means totally separate and distinct from each other.18 
These quotes, as with those discussed earlier, highlight the early fears 
the Framers had concerning state power. As the administrative state began 
to develop in the late 1800s and early 1900s, scholars differed as to whether 
it preserved or encroached upon the separation of powers viewed so 
necessary at the founding but generally viewed it with a cautious eye.19 Even 
the effects of the Great Depression and World War II were insufficient to 
shift permanently the American skepticism of concentration of power. 
Congress begrudgingly hammered out the Administrative Procedure Act in 
the 1940s as a compromise designed to limit agency power in the wake of 
several wartime and post-Depression expansions of administrative power.20 
By the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the trend had again swung fully toward 
limiting agency power as “[a]gencies were no longer viewed as clinicians, 
                                                                                                                          
17 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 294 (James Madison) (Am. Bar Ass’n ed. 2009). 
18 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 271–72 (James Madison) (Am. Bar Ass’n ed. 2009). 
19 See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth 
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 609 (1984) (discussing the “general worrying about the relationship of 
the Presidency and administration” following the Civil War).  
20 See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79–404 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 5 U.S.C.) (governing the way in which federal administrative agencies may propose and 
establish regulations); see also A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42 
(1935) (“In view of the scope of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are 
imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws . . . is 
virtually unfettered. We think that the code-making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative power.”); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432–33 (1935) (holding 
that the section of the National Industrial Recovery Act in question was an unconstitutional delegation 
of legislative power because it did not provide clear guidelines to the executive); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & 
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 404–08 (1928) (holding that a congressional delegation of power 
under the Tariff Act was not unconstitutional). 
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and social policies were no longer viewed as amenable to correct 
solutions.”21 While social policy did advance at the legislative level during 
this period, agency skepticism remained, leading to substantial divisions 
between agencies and those they regulated.22 Since the 1980s and through 
the present day, debate continues between formalists who believe in strict 
adherence to separation of powers out of fear of concentrated state power 
and functionalists who believe that some ground must be given to allow a 
complex society to function. In both cases, however, scholars, judges, and 
legislators recognize the dangers of concentration of power and view the 
administrative state with a cautious eye, at best accepting its power as a 
necessary evil. This differs substantially from the receptive European 
viewpoint where instrumentalist views of the role of the bureaucratic state 
and related European regulatory agencies receive more open welcome, 
particularly given the complexities of the modern, internet(worked) world. 
Notwithstanding this view of the state, however, some concern with 
private action “bleeds over” from restraints on the State to restraints on 
private action. This is particularly true when the concern regarding harms 
flowing from state action involve the suppression of speech or expression. 
For example, in 1968 Congress passed and the President signed into law the 
Wiretap Act provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
which amended 18 U.S.C. § 2511 to prohibit “any person” from 
“intercept[ing], endeavor[ing] to intercept, or procur[ing] any other person 
to intercept or endeavor to intercept [] any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication.”23 Katz v. United States24 had overturned many years of 
telephone surveillance jurisprudence under Olmstead v. United States25 and 
many years of public concern regarding surveillance activities by U.S. 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies as noted in the Church 
Committee Report.26 As noted in the Church Report, “Katz explicitly left 
open the question . . . [of] whether or not a judicial warrant was required in 
                                                                                                                          
21 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 
1761 (2007). 
22 See David Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. 329, 348–50 (2014) 
(providing examples of agency rulemaking failures resulting from the exclusion of some regulated parties 
in the rulemaking process). 
23 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
24 389 U.S. 347, 350–53 (1967) (holding that law enforcement use of an eavesdropping device to 
intercept the telephone conversation of a criminal suspect, without a judicial warrant, was an 
impermissible search under the Fourth Amendment). 
25 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that the installation and use of a wiretapping device by law 
enforcement to monitor the telephone conversations of criminal suspects without first procuring a warrant 
did not amount to an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment requiring suppression of the acquired 
evidence). 
26 See S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 670, 686 (1976) (discussing concerns of J. Edgar Hoover that the 
public would react adversely to learning of the FBI’s “mail opening” technique). 
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cases ‘involving the national security.’”27 
In response to concerns regarding government surveillance, Congress 
included Title III (the “Wiretap Act”) in the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control 
Act.28 As noted by the Church Report, “the issue of ‘national security’ 
wiretaps, which was left open in Katz, was similarly avoided [in Title III].”29 
Interestingly, however, the Wiretap Act's breadth was not limited in scope 
to Government action. It specifically included “anyone” in its prohibition 
against wiretapping. This law, and many similar state analogs,30 remains in 
effect today as a bulwark against suppression of expression by surveillance 
conducted both by the government and by private actors. 
B. Briefly about the Administrative State in the European Union and the 
regulation of data protection 
The European Union, by contrast, is not a real federalist state like the 
U.S. Quoting from a very important judgment of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ): 
The [European] Community constitutes a new legal order of 
international law for the benefit of which the States have 
limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and 
the subjects of which comprise not only member States but 
also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of 
member States, community law therefore not only imposes 
obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon 
them rights which become part of their legal heritage. These 
rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the 
Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty 
imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as 
upon the member States and upon the Institutions of the 
Community.31 
It is not clear, in fact, what is “new” in the European Community, from 
a legal point of view.32 According to some scholars, it can be viewed as a 
                                                                                                                          
27 Id. at 288. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 See Laws on Recording Conversations in All 50 States, MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C. 
(Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.mwl-law.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/LAWS-ON-RECORDING-
CONVERSATIONS-CHART.pdf (stating which jurisdictions require getting consent of the person or 
persons being recorded).  
31 Case 26-62, N,V, Algemene Transport: en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. 
Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration (Feb. 1963) (Neth.) (reference for a preliminary ruling: 
Tariefcommissie). 
32 On these issues, see also Ugo Pagallo, La TUTELA DELLA PRIVACY NEGLI STATI UNITI 
D’AMERICA E IN EUROPA 111–113 (Giuffrè ed., 2008) (It.). 
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multi-level constitutional system,33 for others it can be viewed as a sort of 
federalism à la European,34 or a variation of the Medieval jus commune,35 or 
a form of standard organization for the International Law.36 
Besides the difficult classification of European federalism, it is 
interesting to note that the E.U. is a union of states and citizens with well-
identified limits to the central authority. In fact, looking at E.U. legislative 
activity, member states are not inclined to welcome regulations which have 
immediate legal force for individuals within the member states, preferring 
instead the use of Directives, which need to be transposed in national laws 
to be fully effective in every single state.37 
The difficulties of qualification of E.U. administrative state did not 
prevent the member states from striving for a common vision of privacy 
regulation among the states. This was clear since the beginning of Directive 
95/46/EC, which defines a set of objectives that must be achieved by single 
state law and aims to create a common framework between the Member 
States.38 After almost twenty years of existence of the Directive, the E.U. 
faced that the implementation of the objectives with single state law created 
“a fragmented legal environment which has created legal uncertainty and 
unequal protection for data subjects.”39 Thus in January 2012, the European 
Commission proposed a comprehensive reform of data protection rules, 
putting the completion of this reform as a policy priority.  
The objective of this new set of rules is to return control of personal data 
to citizens, and to simplify the regulatory environment for businesses.  
In fact, the data protection regulation is a pillar of the E.U. strategy for 
creating the so-called Digital Single Market, which aims to remove the 
barriers for Europeans when using online tools and services. The entire 
                                                                                                                          
33 See Ingolf Pernice, Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European 
Constitution-Making Revisited?, 36 COMMON L. MARKET REV. 703, 707 (1999) (Neth.) (defining a multi-
level constitution as a “constitution made up of the constitutions of the Member States bound together 
by a complementary constitutional body consisting of the European Treaties [].”). 
34 See J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: “DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN 
EMPEROR?” AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 24 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 1999) 
(describing the constitutional system among the European Community). 
35 See H. Coing, Von Bologna bis Brussels: Europäische Gemeinsamkeit, Gegenwart und Zukunft, 
Kölner Juristische Gesellschaft, IX, Bergish Gladbach-Köln, 1989. 
36 See Theodor Schilling, The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order: An Analysis of Possible 
Foundations, 37 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 389, 396–97 (1996) (discussing how the case law of the ECJ shows 
an evolution and adoption of treaties as a constitution). 
37 See Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering, in THE 
FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
EUROPEAN Union 214 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001) (explaining how member 
states pass Directives which require legislative action to become fully effective within that state).  
38 See Julia M. Fromholz, The European Union Data Privacy Directive, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
461, 467–469 (2000). 
39 Viviane Reding, The European Data Protection Framework for the Twenty-First Century, 2 
INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 119, 121 (2012). 
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strategy is focused on creating an area of trading which could contribute 
€415 billion to the European economy, boosting jobs, growth, competition, 
investment and innovation.  
Thus, there are strong economic basis behind this reform, which is 
composed of two legal texts: the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR)40 and the Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to 
the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or 
the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such data.41 
The GDPR will be applicable starting in May 2018 and will have a 
tremendous impact on data protection regulation. 
Another step of the Digital Single Market strategy is about 
cybersecurity, which is often connected with data protection issues. In this 
sense, the Network Information Security Directive, as stated by the 
European Commission, will provide legal measures to boost the overall level 
of cybersecurity in the E.U. by ensuring: 
? Member States preparedness by requiring them to be 
appropriately equipped, e.g. via a Computer Security Incident 
Response Team (CSIRT) and a competent national NIS 
authority; 
? cooperation among all the Member States, by setting up a 
cooperation group, in order to support and facilitate strategic 
cooperation and the exchange of information among member 
states. They will also need to set a CSIRT Network, in order to 
promote swift and effective operational cooperation on specific 
cybersecurity incidents and sharing information about risks; 
? a culture of security across sectors which are vital for our 
economy and society and moreover rely heavily on ICTs, such 
as energy, transport, water, banking, financial market 
infrastructures, healthcare, and digital infrastructure. 
Businesses in these sectors that are identified by the member 
states as operators of essential services will have to take 
appropriate security measures and to notify serious incidents to 
                                                                                                                          
40 See Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) 2016 O.J. (L. 119/1) 
(explaining that one example is the recent decision to remove roaming costs by 2017 between the 
European mobile phone operators).  
41 Directive 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for 
the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection, or prosecution of criminal offenses or the 
execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council 
Framework Decision 2008/911/JHA, 2016 O.J. (L. 119/89). 
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the relevant national authority. Also key digital service 
providers (search engines, cloud computing services and online 
marketplaces) will have to comply with the security and 
notification requirements under the new Directive.42  
In a message from July 5, 2016, the European Commission “encouraged 
Member States to make the most of NIS coordination mechanisms” and 
signed an agreement with members of the cybersecurity industry to better 
equip Europe against cyber-attacks and to strengthen the competitiveness of 
its cybersecurity sector—creating a contractual Public-Private Partnership 
(cPPP)—which is expected to drive further market-oriented policy measures 
in the forthcoming months.43  
II. DEFINING THE IDEA (NOT THE LAW) OF PRIVACY FOR U.S. AND E.U. 
CITIZENS: SIMILITUDES AND DIFFERENCES 
This Section builds on the comparative analysis of the administrative 
state in the U.S. and E.U., translating those differences into a framework for 
understanding the origins of privacy regulation in each society and 
investigating what commonalities might exist. Using a perhaps-
controversial approach to define privacy not starting from the premise of 
existing law, but rather from the premise of what are the underlying 
historical concerns, it proceeds to identify that the two respective privacy 
regulatory frameworks share a common fear of privacy invasions as 
“chilling,” or deterring, certain actions by individuals. The frameworks 
diverge, however, with respect to with which actors each society seems most 
concerned will engage in such invasion.44 Following from the discussion in 
Section I, this Section argues that U.S. privacy regulation focuses on chilling 
effects of state action, whereas E.U. privacy regulation focuses on chilling 
effects of (private) corporate action.  
A. The Concept of “Chilling Effects” 
“Chilling Effects” is a much celebrated concept in jurisprudence and 
scholarship in the United States, especially related to the First Amendment.45 
It describes a condition in which invasions of privacy or the fear thereof 
                                                                                                                          
42 The Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS Directive), 
EUR.COMMISSION (July 28, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/network-and-
information-security-nis-directive. 
43 Id. 
44 It is worth nothing that multiple scholars have observed that the U.S. and E.U. perceptions of 
privacy also diverge in their concept of privacy as an “exclusionary” versus a “fundamental” right, and 
in the degree to which that right is a political decision or a Constitutionally-binding choice. Such 
distinctions, while quite important, are orthogonal to the argument of this Section, which focuses on the 
historical similarities of “fear against invasion” inherent in both societies’ views of privacy. 
45 See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect”, 
58 B.U.L. REV. 685 (1978). 
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cause individuals to change their behaviors, abstaining from otherwise-
lawful activity not because of its proscription by society but out of fear of 
public association with that activity. This concept is a value shared by many 
societies around the world and provides a starting point from which to 
identify more specific normative values regarding privacy shared among 
U.S. and E.U. nations. 
The concept of “Chilling Effects” is defined by two characteristics: (1) 
that individuals perceive there is at least a risk of their activity or condition 
being observed by another who may disseminate those observations; and (2) 
that individuals change their behavior—discontinuing or hiding that activity 
or condition—out of fear of public association with that activity or 
condition.46 This formulation suggests a means of identifying shared 
intrinsic privacy commitments among nations whose extrinsic (expressed 
through law) privacy commitments may differ widely. 
Historically, the U.S. Supreme Court has been reluctant to recognize 
chilling effects as a sufficient ground for a violation of constitutional 
rights,47 while in the E.U. the European Court of Human Rights, the 
European Court of Justice and many state courts have recognized many 
times that the possibility of undisclosed collection and storage of personal 
identifiable information can create a danger for fundamental rights,48 but 
despite this, the E.U. courts have been in general reluctant to recognize 
chilling effects when people give their consent to data processing. 
A recent study, however, has shown that there is a risk that people will 
experience a chilling effect when consenting to the disclosure of personal 
identifiable information, intending the chilling effect “as an increased 
propensity to comply with social norms.”49 Both the increase in societal 
                                                                                                                          
46 See Brief of Amici Curiae First Amendment Legal Scholars, Wikimedia Foundation v. Nat’l 
Security Agency, 143 F. Supp. 3d 344 (D. Md. Dec. 18, 2015) at 3, 8–9, 
http://www.margotkaminski.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/085-001-Brief-of-Amici-Curiae-First-
Amendment-Legal-Scholars-1.pdf; see also id. at 362 n.27 (recognizing the importance of “chilling” but 
rejecting that as adequate to establish standing); see also generally Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 
398 (2013); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 
(1972). 
47 See, e.g., Clapper, 568 U.S. at 418 (noting the plaintiffs could not establish standing by claiming 
they experienced a chilling effect that resulted from a governmental policy); Laird, 408 U.S. at 3 
(rejecting the complaint of a “‘chilling effect’ on the exercise of the First Amendment rights where [the] 
effect is [] caused . . . only [by] the existence . . . of intelligence gathering”). 
48 See, e.g., Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post-och telestyrelsen and Sec. of State for the Home Dep’t. v. 
Tom Watson et al., Joined Cases 203/15 and 698/15 ECJ (2016) (emphasizing the importance of 
protection of the right to privacy and confidentiality with respect to the processing of personal data) and 
Bărbulescu v. Romania, application no. 61496/08 ECtHR (2017) (emphasizing that communications in 
the workplace are covered by the concepts of “private life” and “correspondence” protected by Article 8 
of the European Convention of Human Rights). 
49 See Yoan Hermstrüwer & Stephan Dickert, Tearing the Veil of Privacy Law: An Experiment on 
Chilling Effects and the Right to Be Forgotten 3 (Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on 
Collective Goods, Working Paper No. 5, 2013). 
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recognition of chilling effects and the acknowledgement (if not doctrinal 
acceptance) by high courts in both the U.S. and E.U. suggest that, from a 
political compatibility standpoint, the two societies share concern for the 
implications of chilling effects. The shared historical antecedents of “feared 
invasion” into (private) seclusion, discussed in more detail in Section I, 
suggest that adequate shared privacy commitments exist across the Atlantic 
to examine harmonization efforts on that basis.50  
Identifying shared intrinsic privacy commitments, therefore, lends 
weight to two essential arguments of this Article: (1) that procedural 
harmonization is a plausible goal; and (2) that trusting the market—through 
delegation of compliance details to regulated entities—is reasonable given 
these shared commitments. 
B. Overview of U.S. Privacy Regulation 
This subsection provides an overview of Constitutional, statutory, and 
other privacy protections in the United States. The next subsection similarly 
overviews parallel protections in the European Union. Subsection D then 
compares these two regimes to demonstrate the plausibility of procedural 
harmonization. 
1. Constitutional Protections 
There is no express privacy right in the U.S. Constitution. Rather, there 
are effective rights that derive, either directly or indirectly, from the 
protections afforded by the Amendments in the Bill of Rights. Direct 
derivative rights are those which necessarily flow from the express 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. For example, a privacy interest in one’s 
person, residence, and certain other excludable property flows from the 
Fourth Amendment.51 Indirect derivative rights are those the courts have 
recognized as necessary corollaries to the privileges afforded by the Bill of 
Rights Amendments. A privacy interest in one's associative activities, for 
example, has been recognized in certain contexts as flowing from the First 
(and Fourteenth) Amendments.52 A general privacy interest in the “marital 
bedroom” has been recognized as flowing indirectly from a collection of 
                                                                                                                          
50 See supra Section I. 
51 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The overriding function of the Fourth 
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State”); 
Priscilla J. Smith et al., When Machines Are Watching: How Warrantless Use of GPS Surveillance 
Technology Violates the Fourth Amendment Right Against Unreasonable Searches, 121 YALE L.J. 177, 
183–84 (2011) (discussing Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27 (2001)). 
52 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (stating that there is immunity from 
state scrutiny of membership lists under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, applying the First 
Amendment protections to “associate freely with others” to action by individual states under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and holding that Alabama failed to demonstrate a “controlling justification for 
the deterrent effect on the free enjoyment of the right to associate”). 
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several of the Bill of Rights Amendments.53 
These provisions share all concern restraints on government action, as 
opposed to a general privacy interest. At a general level, however, they 
implement three substantive privacy commitments (if only against certain 
actors): (1) a privacy interest in residential (and similar) spaces; (2) a privacy 
interest in one's own body; and (3) a privacy interest in state-recognized 
marital relationships. 
2. Federal Statutory Protections Concerning Government Processing 
of Information (the Privacy Act of 1974) 
The Privacy Act of 1974 places obligations on most elements of the U.S. 
federal government which process information records describing 
individuals.54 It limits the government from disclosing information from 
systems of records absent express consent of the individual or if the 
disclosure falls into one of a list of enumerated statutory exceptions. It is the 
only (non-sector specific) privacy law of general applicability imposing 
affirmative duties on a data processor in the United States, but is limited 
solely to (federal) government actors. On a general level, the Privacy Act 
implements a substantive commitment to the privacy of non-public 
individuals’ information acquired by government systems, but only as it 
pertains to the federal government as a data processor and subject to several 
exceptions. Additionally, the Privacy Act only applies to government 
agencies, and not to the courts, legislature, or non-agency executive entities. 
The Act thus provides limited input describing potential shared substantive 
privacy commitments, however it does indicate a receptiveness in the United 
States to the concept of a general information processing privacy law as 
pertained the “feared actor” (the state) in the United States. 
3. Federal Sector-Specific Statutory Provisions 
Many industries are subject to sector-specific regulation in the United 
States, but two stand out prominently in the privacy context. Both the 
healthcare and finance industries have comprehensive legislation requiring 
both specific actions by regulated entities and requiring those entities to 
develop (and adhere to) compliance plans for managing substantive privacy 
commitments and the information security measures that implement those 
commitments. Financial entities are covered by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act (GLBA)55 and healthcare entities are covered by the Health Insurance 
                                                                                                                          
53 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (asserting that marriage is a “right 
of privacy older than the Bill of Rights”). 
54 Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a) 
(summarizing when the privacy of an individual is directly affected). 
55 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6804, 6805 (2012). 
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Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).56 Notably, as Thaw describes 
elsewhere, both these statutory frameworks utilize a form of Management-
Based Regulatory Delegation.57 
These two statutory frameworks—both of which apply to private 
actors—implement general substantive commitments to privacy in two 
specific information areas: (1) medical/healthcare information; and (2) 
personal financial information. 
4. Federal Medium-Specific Statutory Provisions 
In additional to affording protections for information in specific 
substantive areas, such as that processed by healthcare and financial 
industries, U.S. federal law (and some U.S. states) afford statutory 
protections to information conveyed via certain media. For example, mail 
sent via the U.S. Postal Service is subject to statutory protection prohibiting 
its interception (or surveillance) both by private and government actors (with 
limited exceptions).”58 Likewise, the Wiretap Act provides similar 
protections against the interception of telephone, telegraph, and similar 
communications.59 Amendments to the Wiretap Act included in the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) provide similar 
protections for computer and information system based data 
communications via telecommunications systems while in-transit,60 and 
amendments to the Wiretap Act included in the Stored Communications Act 
(SCA) provided similar protections (of limited temporal duration) for such 
data while at rest.61 
This statutory framework—which, subject to various exceptions, applies 
both to state and to private actors—implements a general substantive 
commitment to the privacy of information being processed for transit (and 
in some cases storage) by telecommunications networks.62 
5. Federal Consumer Protection Law and the FTC 
The Federal Trade Commission Act makes unlawful unfair and 
deceptive trade practices and grants the Federal Trade Commission the 
                                                                                                                          
56 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
57 See David Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 287, 314–17, 
324–36 (2014) (comparing the efficacy, in the cybersecurity context, of “[m]anagement-[b]ased 
[r]egulatory [d]elegation” to other types of regulation such as “[d]irective [r]egulation”). 
58 See 18 U.S.C. § 1701, 1708. 
59 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2008). 
60 H.R. 4952, 99th Cong. (1986). 
61 See id. (including the subtitled Stored Communications Act (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 
2701)).  
62 Note, however, that this commitment does not extend to actors who provide the endpoint 
equipment, such as a computer provided by an employer or a wireless network provided by an educational 
institution. 
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authority to bring adjudicatory enforcement procedures against entities who 
engage in such practices.63 The FTC has used this authority to engage in a 
substantial amount of privacy-related regulatory activities for nearly two 
decades.64 The FTC’s scope of enforcement authority is broad with respect 
to both the industrial sector and the nature of data or technology, but its 
regulatory activities are primarily reactive.65 Furthermore, the FTC’s 
participation in regulating privacy and data security activities was a self-
granted power inasmuch as the FTC Act does not in any way expressly 
address that authority.66 Other limited authority has, however, been granted 
to the FTC by Congress in this regard, such as the regulation of data 
collection regarding the online activities of children.67  
It is difficult to draw conclusions regarding what substantive privacy 
commitments, if any, the FTC Act and the FTC’s privacy and data security 
jurisprudence implement. At best, a commitment to preventing deception 
regarding privacy practices can be inferred from the Act and the 
Commission’s enforcement activities. A broad reading of the scope of the 
Commission's enforcement activity might suggest a commitment to 
“reasonable” privacy and security practices, but this topic is subject to 
substantial debate68 and there is insufficient evidence to conclude it 
implements a clear substantive privacy commitment. 
6. State Statutory Privacy Privileges 
Most U.S. jurisdictions afford special privileges to certain types of 
communications between specific parties. These privileges can take the form 
of evidentiary privileges (preclusions of the introduction of such 
communications during formal adjudicatory or judicial proceedings) and/or 
confidentiality requirements on the part of certain parties. The most common 
examples include communications with attorneys, psychotherapists (as 
separate from other medical practitioners), medical practitioners (to a lesser 
degree), and clergy. In most U.S. jurisdictions, these parties both are 
required to keep confidential certain information acquired in their 
professional capacity and the government is precluded (in most 
circumstances) from attempting to acquire that information from the 
                                                                                                                          
63 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).  
64 See generally Chris Jay Hoofnagle, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION LAW AND POLICY (2016). 
65 Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, supra note 57, at 336–40; see also Daniel J. 
Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 
587 (2014); David Bernard Thaw, Characterizing, Classifying, and Understanding Information Security 
Laws and Regulations: Considerations for Policymakers and Organizations Protecting Sensitive 
Information Assets (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (May 11, 2011, on file with 
the University of California), http://www.davidthaw.com/papers/DavidThawDissertationFinal.pdf 
(“Unlike the assessments conceived under traditional management based regulation, FTC-ordered 
assessments are reactive in nature instead of proactive.”).  
66 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 65, at 598–99. 
67 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b) (1998). 
68 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 246 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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professional or the individuals they serve. Additionally, while no duty of 
confidentiality exists between spouses, the government is prevented from 
compelling spouses to disclose information about one another in criminal 
matters. 
These examples again implement the substantive privacy commitment 
to the protection of healthcare and medical information and to the protection 
of marital intimacy. Additionally, they describe several other examples, such 
as legal advice and spiritual advice, where U.S. law recognizes certain 
substantive privacy commitments. 
7. State Security Breach Notification Laws 
Nearly all U.S. jurisdictions have security breach notification (SBN) 
laws which require the custodian of sensitive data or data processor to notify 
individuals described in data that custodian holds or processes in the event 
this sensitive data becomes compromised by an unauthorized party. The 
implementation of these laws varies from jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction, but 
they all implement an underlying substantive privacy commitment that 
individuals are entitled to be informed when certain sensitive data may have 
been accessed and/or acquired by an unauthorized party. 
C. Overview of E.U. Privacy Regulation 
This section provides an overview of E.U. privacy protections parallel 
to that in section B. 
1. Constitutional Protections 
The starting point of privacy protection from a constitutional point of 
view is Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union,69 which states the right of respect for private and family life,70 and 
Article 8 regarding the protection of personal data.71 They are both positive 
rights, and they are identified, unlike in the U.S. Constitution, as 
fundamental rights.  
Looking at the time when the Charter was issued, however, it is evident 
that it comes after many years of privacy legislation in the E.U., both in 
                                                                                                                          
69 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 7 2010 O.J. C 83/02, 
http://fra.europa.eu/en/charterpedia/article/7-respect-private-and-family-life. 
70 Id. (“Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and 
communications.”). 
71 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 8 2010 O.J. C 83/02, 
http://fra.europa.eu/en/charterpedia/article/8-protection-personal-data (“1. Everyone has the right to the 
protection of personal data concerning him or her . . . . 2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified 
purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down 
by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the 
right to have it rectified . . . . 3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent 
authority.”). 
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member states—for example France, Denmark, Sweden or Germany—and 
in the European community, with Directive 95/46/EC. 
To look at an older source of law, Article 8 of the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom was signed 
in Rome in 1950, and it establishes the right of respect for private and family 
life.72 It is interesting to note that, for the first time, the E.U. has a rule against 
unreasonable invasion of privacy “by a public authority” akin to those found 
in the United States. Finally, the importance of this rule is underlined in 
Article 6, Section 3, of the Treaty on European Union.73 
Another issue that must be considered regarding the constitutional 
protections of privacy in the E.U. is that the rules just cited do not overwrite 
the basic rules provided, for example, by the constitutions of the single 
member states. This creates a legal patchwork that needs harmonization74 
and implies the use of the directives and subsequent transposition by 
member states. 
2. Federal Statutory Protections Concerning Processing of 
Information 
The most important law, excluding the soon to be enforced General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR),75 is Directive 95/46/EC, enacted in 1995.76 
The aim of the Directive is to harmonize the privacy regulations in all 
member states by setting out common rules for data protection. 
The first effort was to identify, in Article 2, a set of definitions as 
                                                                                                                          
72 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 7 2010 O.J. C 83/02, supra note 
69 (“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 
. . . 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is 
in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”). 
73 See Treaty on European Union (consolidated version) No. 6655/1/08 REV 1 of Apr. 30, 2008, 
art. 6 § 3, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/20000222/libe/art6/default_en.htm (“Fundamental 
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall 
constitute general principles of the Union’s law.”). 
74 See D. J. SOLOVE & P. M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 1110 (Aspen ed. 2011) 
(“This term of European community law refers to formal regulatory attempts to increase the similarity 
of legal measures in member states.”).  
75 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament & of the Council of 27 April 2016 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679&from=IT.  
76 Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of 
Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281).  
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“personal data,”77 “processing of personal data,”78 “controller,”79 
“processor,”80 and “data subject’s consent.”81 Thus, we may now find a set 
of definitions in all privacy laws of member states, even if this set is not 
exactly the same of the Directive. 
Another important rule is Article 5, regarding the implementation of the 
Directive by member states,82 which provides general parameters for the 
transposition of the Directive’s provisions by each member state. It is 
important because it is another example of the refusal of direct regulation 
from central authority. 
The Directive includes every possible processing of data, with some 
exception for public security, state security, and criminal law. One of the 
most important requirements set by the Directive is the duty, for the data 
controller, to preliminary inform the data subject on the purposes for which 
the data are intended. After the information, with some exceptions, the data 
subject must express his or her consent to data processing, especially for data 
used for direct marketing or profiling of customers. The data subject also 
has a permanent right to monitor and challenge the use of his or her personal 
data for all the steps of processing until the lawful destruction of data 
themselves. 
The Directive, finally, prescribes the creation of a Data Protection 
Authority in every member state to supervise the enforcement of the 
Directive and of the national privacy regulation. 
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (effective May 2018) 
represents an important change from the nature of previous legal tools used: 
while a “Directive” aims to set common objectives and leave to each of the 
                                                                                                                          
77 See id. at 8 (“‘[P]ersonal data’ shall mean any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, 
in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, 
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity[.]”). 
78 See id. (“‘[P]rocessing of personal data’ (‘processing’) shall mean any operation or set of 
operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, 
recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by 
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure 
or destruction[.]”).  
79 See id. (“‘[C]ontroller’ shall mean the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any 
other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of 
personal data; where the purposes and means of processing are determined by national or Community 
laws or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination may be designated by national 
or Community law[.]”).  
80 See id. (“‘[P]rocessor’ shall mean a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other 
body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller[.]”). 
81 See id. at 9 (“‘[T]he data subject’s consent’ shall mean any freely given specific and informed 
indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him 
being processed.”).  
82 See id. (“Member States shall, within the limits of the provisions of this Chapter, determine more 
precisely the conditions under which the processing of personal data is lawful.”).  
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Member States the form and the method by which the Directive is transposed 
into national law, by contrast a “Regulation” is binding in the form is issued. 
This means that the Regulation is much less “elastic” in its implementation 
than would be a Directive.  
Thanks to the GDPR, “[c]onsistent and homogenous application of the 
rules for the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data should be ensured 
throughout the Union,”83 but the GDPR itself leaves some margin of 
discretion to the Member States for some specific situations (e.g. for the 
processing of sensitive data). 
The GDPR, then, is a comprehensive legal text that leaves some limited 
topics to be defined by the single states. The domestic Data Protection 
Authorities, a supranational organization like the Article 29 Working Party, 
or the European Data Protection Supervisor may assist in this process. 
In this regard, the ICO issued a guide84 on March 17, 2017 for migrating 
to the new General Data Protection Regulation, and the Article 29 Working 
Party is publishing several guidelines to help promulgate understanding of 
the new or different obligations included into the GDPR.85 
3. Federal Medium-Specific Statutory Provisions  
A good example of the Federal Medium-Specific Statutory Provision is 
Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the 
protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and 
Commission Regulation (E.U.) No. 611/2013 of 24 June 2013 on the 
measures applicable to the notification of personal data breaches under 
Directive 2002/58/EC. It provides a basic rule for the so-called “unsolicited 
communications” by automated telephone calls, faxes, texts and e-mail, 
which is the “opt-in” rule. According to Article 13, the data subjects need to 
express his or her consent to receive commercial communications regarding 
goods or services offered by a company, and they have a permanent right to 
“opt-out” and stop the delivering of these communications. 
The text of the Directive was amended by Directive 2009/136/EC and 
now includes the definition of personal data breach, which means “a breach 
of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, 
unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or 
otherwise processed in connection with the provision of a publicly available 
                                                                                                                          
83 Regulation 2016/679, supra note 40, at n.10. 
84 Information Commissioner’s Office, Preparing for the General Data Protection Regulation: 12 
Steps to Take Now (May 2017), https://ico.org.uk/media/1624219/preparing-for-the-gdpr-12-steps.pdf. 
85 For example, the Article 29 Working Party has already issued guidelines on the right to data 
portability, on the designation of a data protection officer and on how to identify a controller or 
processor’s lead supervisory authority. Article 29 Working Party, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=50083. 
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electronic communications service in the Community.”86 
This Directive, called the ePrivacy Directive, is now undergoing a 
reformation process likely to result in a new version sometime in late 2017 
or early 2018.87  
4. State Statutory Privacy Privileges: The Italy Case 
The member states have usually transposed the principles of Directives 
95/46/EC and 2002/58/EC with satisfactory compliance. In some cases, 
however, states have extended the principles of the Directives by adding 
other rules for data processing. 
In Italy, for example, the failure to adopt the minimum security 
measures88 in data processing is a criminal offense, which can be punished 
by detention for up to two years. 
Italy has also implemented the steps to be taken following a personal 
data breach.89 These steps include notifying the Italian Data Protection 
Authority without undue delay and, if the personal data breach is likely to 
be detrimental to the personal data or privacy of the contracting party or 
another individual, the provider must also notify without delay the breach to 
the contracting party or the individual.90  
In addition, the notification to the contracting party or individual must 
at least include a description of the nature of the personal data breach and 
the contact point where additional information can be obtained, and it must 
list the measures recommended to mitigate the possible detrimental effects 
of the personal data breach.91 The Italian Data Protection Authority, from its 
side, may issue a decision containing guidelines and instructions with regard 
to the circumstances under which a provider is obliged to notify personal 
data breaches, the format of such notification, and the manner in which the 
notification is to be made.92 
                                                                                                                          
86 Directive 2009/136, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 
Amending Directive 2002/22/EC on Universal Service and Users’ Rights Relating to Electronic 
Communications Networks and Services, Directive 2002/58/EC Concerning the Processing of Personal 
Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector and Regulation (EC) No 
2006/2004 on Cooperation Between National Authorities Responsible for the Enforcement of Consumer 
Protection Laws, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 29.  
87 On January 10, 2017 the draft text “Proposal for a Regulation on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications” was issued. Proposal for a Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications, 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/proposal-regulation-
privacy-and-electronic-communications. 
88 Legislative Decree no. 196 of 30 June 2003 (defining misuses in Section 33 of the Legislative 
Decree n.196 of 30 June 2003 as “the minimum security measures . . . in order to ensure a minimum level 
of personal data protection.”).  
89 See id. (showing Italy’s implementation of an entire data protection code). 
90 See id. (requiring the provider of a publicly available communications service to inform 
subscribers and, if possible, users about the risk of network security breach). 
91 Id. (requiring the provider to also report it to the government’s security data authority). 
92 Section 32 of Legislative Decree no. 196 of 30 June 2003.  
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D. U.S. – E.U. Shared Commitments 
As discussed in the preceding sections, U.S. and E.U. privacy law have 
many textual and structural differences. We begin with a comparative 
examination summarizing these differences, and then shift to discuss 
commonalities, how those commonalities suggest the plausibility of 
procedural harmonization, and how such harmonization is possible 
notwithstanding these differences. 
Unlike the European Union, privacy law in the United States lacks a 
central, unifying framework. There is no general privacy law in the United 
States, which comprises rather a patchwork of constitutional, statutory, and 
regulatory mechanisms, each giving effect to different privacy protections. 
Many of these protections are incidental to other rights.93 The most prevalent 
elements of this patchwork includes constitutional protections (express and 
implied), federal statutory protections concerning government processing of 
information, federal statutory protections concerning sector-specific or 
communications-medium specific processing of or access to information, 
federal regulatory interpretation of general consumer protection statutes, and 
state statutory (evidentiary and other) privacy privileges and breach 
notification obligations.94 
Most notably, these protections nearly all take the form of negative 
liberties—rights precluding a specific actor from taking a specific action. 
This starkly contrasts with the E.U. approach, which, as discussed below, 
adopts a positive liberties approach including enumerated rights. This 
section briefly outlines the protections described above and extrapolates 
from those protections a set of common “core commitments” present in U.S. 
privacy protections.95 
As noted by James Q. Whitman, “we are in the midst of significant 
privacy conflicts between the United States and the countries of Western 
Europe—conflicts that reflect unmistakable differences in sensibilities about 
what ought to be kept ‘private.’”96 
In fact, there are different privacy habits between the U.S. and E.U. For 
example, discussion of salary and compensation is permitted in the U.S., 
while many E.U. countries frown upon or prohibit disclosure of this 
information. Aside from different habits, however, E.U. privacy regulation 
is generally more protective for certain kinds of privacy like consumer data, 
credit reporting, employees in the workplace, discovery in civil litigation, 
                                                                                                                          
93 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (describing the concept of 
“penumbras” giving rise to privacy rights inherent in the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to 
the U.S. Constitution). 
94 See McGeveran, supra note 2, at 972–79. 
95 See id. 
96 James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE 
L.J. 1151, 1155 (2004).  
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dissemination of images of minors, and cameras used in public areas. Some 
of these protections, particularly employee and litigation privacy, may strike 
Americans as unusual. They are, however, commonplace for for Europeans 
and likely well-depict the nature of the U.S.-E.U. substantive privacy 
conflict. This conflict has led to many disputes, in particular trade-related 
battles, stemming in non-trivial part from these different privacy 
perceptions.97 
One of the paramount cases about the different view of privacy is the 
controversial ECJ’s decision of the “right to be forgotten.”98 While some 
U.S. privacy scholars are stating that “[t]his is a form of censorship, one that 
would most likely be unconstitutional if attempted in the United States,”99 
E.U. privacy scholars are more optimistic because  
the positive aspect of this decision is that it induces to 
reconsider positively the Article 17 of the EU Proposal for a 
General Data Protection Regulation, which is clearer that the 
scenario depicted by this decision. This provision admits a 
specific exception for freedom of expression and recognizes 
the role played by courts and regulatory authorities in deciding 
which data must be erased. Finally, it empowers the 
Commission to define detailed procedures and solutions to 
delete personal information.100 
The contrast between these two conceptions of privacy, as noted by 
Robert Post, describes a great difference: continental privacy protection is a 
form of protection of personal dignity, American privacy protection is a 
form of protection of personal liberty.101 
Starting from this difference, it is easy to understand why U.S. citizens 
are more concerned about privacy invasion by the state, especially within 
                                                                                                                          
97 See, e.g., Case C-317/04 & C-318/04, Parliament v. Council & Parliament v. Comm’n, 2015 
E.C.J. I-4755 (holding that the arrangements on the transfer of Passenger Name Records of air passengers 
from the E.C. to the US Bureau of Customs and Border Protection were illegal and should be annulled).  
98 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 2013, 
¶ 102. 
99 Jonathan Zittrain, Don’t Force Google to ‘Forget’, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2014, at A29; see also 
Daniel Solove, What Google Must Forget: The EU Ruling on the Right to Be Forgotten, LINKEDIN (May 
13, 2014), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140513230300-2259773-what-google-must-forget-the-
eu-ruling-on-the-right-to-be-forgotten?trk=object-title [] (“[A]lthough recognized in US law, the right to 
be forgotten only exists in a few pockets of the law and is nothing compared to the rather dramatic ruling 
of the EU Court.”). 
100 Alessandro Mantelero, A Few Notes About the Google Case and the Right to Be Forgotten, ICT 
L. & DATA PROT. (May 14, 2014), https://ictlawandataprotection.wordpress.com/2014/05/14/a-few-
notes-about-the-google-case-and-the-right-to-be-forgotten/.  
101 See Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2087–95 (2001) (describing 
“different and in some respects incompatible concepts of privacy”).  
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the “sanctity” of their own homes,102 and E.U. citizens are more concerned 
about privacy invasion from the media or corporations.103 It is easy to 
understand, similarly, why American privacy law framework is made by 
many statutory provisions containing negative rights, as seen in Section II, 
and continental privacy framework is more systematically developed 
focusing on positive rights. 
Notwithstanding these differences, however, this Article advances the 
proposition that shared fears of “privacy invasion”—beginning from the 
concept of Chilling Effects—make procedural regulatory harmonization 
between U.S. and E.U. regimes possible. As noted by Professor Whitman,104 
for example:  
[I]t would be wrong to say that there is some absolute 
difference between American and continental European law. 
But the issue is not whether there is an absolute difference. . . 
. [I]t is the relative differences that matter. Americans and 
Europeans certainly do sometimes arrive at the same 
conclusions. Nevertheless, they have different starting points 
and different ultimate understandings of what counts as a just 
society. 
This little excerpt exemplifies this Article and similar others, because despite 
the differences we have enumerated above, there are common fears that can 
form the foundation of common privacy regulation between the two western 
blocs.105 This common foundation can make such regulatory harmonization 
usable, effective, and enforceable by the constituent nations and states. 
Reaching a unified privacy regulation represents a good opportunity for free 
exchange of personal identifiable information, with advantages for trading 
and in general free circulation of people and goods. 
Even if the perceptions of privacy views are different, U.S. and E.U. 
have shared commitments about data protection and data processing. We can 
find a form of convergence if we look at the General Data Protection 
                                                                                                                          
102 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); see Solove, supra note 99 (reporting on the 
E.U. Court’s decision to protection citizen’s privacy from being stored permanently). 
103 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, 
52 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2000). 
104 Whitman, supra note 96, at 1163.  
105 See GABRIELA ZANFIR, EU AND US DATA PROTECTION REFORMS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 217–
22 (2012) (providing a comparative view of data protection reform projects from the U.S. and the E.U.); 
DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 1–3 (2013); Kenneth 
Bamberger & Deirdre Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 247–
54 (2011) (reporting findings from studies of corporate privacy managers); Francesca Bignami, 
European versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 
B.C.L. REV. 609, 682–683 (2007). Avner Levin & Mary Jo Nicholson, Privacy Law in the United States, 
the EU and Canada: The Allure of the Middle Ground, 2 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 357, 357–60 (2005) 
(suggesting, as a compromise, the Canadian approach to privacy and personal information regulation). 
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Regulation (GDPR) and specific U.S. law such as the Consumer Privacy Bill 
of Rights. Some differences still exist,106 but both approaches would provide 
accountable and effective safeguards for individuals and consumers against 
the rapid evolution of technology, surveillance, profiling techniques, and 
both reforms look forward to “a more protected individual [and consumer] 
and a more responsible data controller or data processor.”107 While not 
formally codified into U.S. law, this comparative example lends support to 
the proposition that certain common goals underlie both U.S. and E.U. 
privacy regulation. 
Yes, differences in privacy regulation between the U.S. and E.U. will 
likely remain. This is why we believe that the answer to a unified privacy 
regulation cannot derive from convergence of existing laws but rather 
requires a new, bottom-up approach, using Management-Based Regulatory 
Delegation (or “Federated Regulation”) theory applied to federalist systems 
of governance. We call this application Market-Supervised Regulatory 
Delegation. 
III. COMMON GROUND IN U.S. AND E.U. BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION: 
UNIFYING PRIVACY REGULATION—“MARKET-SUPERVISED REGULATORY 
DELEGATION” 
Market-Supervised Regulatory Delegation presents a theoretical 
framework in which nation-parties to a multi-lateral agreement consent to 
limited general principles and a common enforcement procedure, and then 
implement those principles into law—while each still retains substantial 
ability to implement their own national policy choices. Private actors are 
free to choose in which nations to conduct business,108 but that choice is no 
longer dominated by the transaction cost of varying regulatory compliance 
                                                                                                                          
106 The main difference is the broad scope of the Regulation compared with the narrow scope of the 
CPBR. 
107 ZANFIR, supra note 105, at 217, 222.  
108 This method also is superior to current policy in that current (and recent) policy frameworks, 
such as the former U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor and the new U.S.-E.U. Privacy Shield fail to give effect to 
respective nations’ privacy protections. In practice, these agreements merely require data processors 
established in the U.S. to certify that they comply with the Principles defined to meet the E.U. data 
protection safeguards. See Requirements of Participation, PRIVACY SHIELD PROGRAM, 
https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=Requirements-of-Participation (last visited Mar. 1, 2017) 
(requiring public commitment by corporation to abide by the Privacy Shield Principles). Clever names 
notwithstanding, these agreements do not effectively extend E.U. member states’ protections to the 
processing of data of E.U. citizens within the United States for companies participating in the Privacy 
Shield. Some criticisms in that sense were expressed by the Article 29 Working Party. See Statement, 
Article 29 Working Party, Statement on the Decision of the European Commission on the EU-US Privacy 
Shield (July 26, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/press-material/press-
release/art29_press_material/2016/20160726_wp29_wp_statement_eu_us_privacy_shield_en.pdf (“It 
also remains unclear how the Privacy Shield Principles shall apply to processors.”). 
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procedures.109 Rather, the dominant factor in the choices by market 
participants to conduct business in a given nature is the substantive policy 
choices of that nation. This allows the market to express global preferences 
without intruding on the sovereign power of nations to make local policy 
decisions (albeit informed by—and perhaps even pressured by—such global 
market forces). 
This Section builds upon the work in Sections I and II to propose a 
method for unifying the process of administering U.S. and E.U. privacy 
regulation by applying concepts of Federated Regulation (Management-
Based Regulatory Delegation) theory to cross-jurisdictional privacy 
management. Such an approach establishes a regime under which 
aspirational goals are laid out by the legislative bodies (i.e., protection 
against “chilling effects” through a list of enumerated positive privacy 
“rights”), which then require the individual jurisdictions to prescribe 
(through their respective administrative processes) that regulated entities 
develop compliance plans to achieve these aspirational goals. By 
standardizing the compliance process, transaction costs for multi-national 
organizations to operate in multiple jurisdictions are lowered. While various 
jurisdictions may require more stringent privacy protections, the 
standardized compliance process facilities organizations’ ability to make 
market-based choices regarding the jurisdictions in which to operate. 
The result becomes a system under which each sovereign nation retains 
the ability to select those privacy norms they wish to enforce, and leaves 
more to market function the choices both of consumers and multi-national 
organizations the jurisdictions in which they wish to operate. This is 
accomplished by the application of a form of process-based standards 
regulation known as Federated Regulation (a form of Management-Based 
Regulatory Delegation). When applied across nations, we describe this 
concept as Supervised Market-Based Regulation. 
A. Federated Regulation (Management-Based Regulatory Delegation) 
Federated Regulation (also known as Management-Based Regulatory 
Delegation) is a theory for engaging private expertise in regulation both on 
the “front-end” (rulemaking) and on the “back-end” (compliance).110 It 
                                                                                                                          
109 Anecdotal evidence, such as the choice of many multi-national corporations to operate in Ireland, 
suggests a race-to-the-bottom among corporations operating in the E.U. to select the nation with the 
lowest-transaction-cost compliance procedures as their base of operations. As of the time of this writing, 
the authors are unaware of any comprehensive empirical study in this regard, and suggest such 
quantitative analysis as worthwhile future work. 
110 See Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, supra note 57 at 324–26 (describing 
Management-Based Regulatory Delegation as having two collaborative parts; the promulgation of 
aspirational goals by the legislators followed by the industry experts drafting compliance plans to achieve 
said goals). 
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combines Kenneth Bamberger's theory of regulatory delegation in 
rulemaking111 with Cary Coglianese and David Lazer's112 theory of 
management-based regulation for compliance to describe a process which 
engages private expertise both to draft regulations and to allow private 
entities to manage their own compliance process. This process has been very 
successful in engaging private expertise to manage healthcare privacy and 
cybersecurity in the United States.113 Under this model, legislatures establish 
an organic statutory framework that calls upon an administrative agency to 
develop regulations in conjunction with the entities subject to that regulation 
(and other relevant stakeholders). The regulations then promulgated by the 
agency, rather than defining strict standards for compliance, instead, lay out 
general or aspirational goals for regulated entities to achieve. Entities then 
are required to develop compliance plans which reasonably achieve those 
goals, and to follow their own plans. This last step becomes the primary 
compliance objective, subject to regulatory agency oversight for 
reasonableness of the plans and entities' adherence to those plans.114 
Federated Regulation suggests a model both applicable to a harmonized 
privacy compliance process itself, and to relationships between nations and 
a harmonized process. The sections that follow discuss its use in these two 
regards. 
B. Federated Regulation Supports National Coordination Toward 
Harmonized Privacy Processes 
Perhaps the greatest challenge of harmonizing any aspect of E.U. and 
U.S. privacy regulation is the vast differences in normative conceptions of 
privacy among the constituent nations.115 Federated Regulation presents one 
option successful at reconciling heterogeneous values into a single, 
functioning regulatory system.116 Applying this approach to developing a 
harmonized privacy compliance regime across the U.S. and E.U. member 
nations presents an approach capable of developing more efficacious 
outcomes than the current much-criticized E.U.-U.S. Privacy Shield 
                                                                                                                          
111 See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and 
Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 386 (2006) (describing the delegation of 
regulatory authority to private firms). 
112 See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private 
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 691, 692, 725 (2003) (describing 
management-based regulation). 
113 See Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, supra note 22, 377 (presenting evidence supporting 
the use of private regulatory capture for public benefit).  
114 See id. at 362–63 (discussing how HIPAA permits covered entities to develop compliance plans 
conforming to its specific needs but while also penalizing for deficiencies in compliance plans). 
115 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 105. 
116 See Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, supra note 22, at 367 (“Thus rather than driving 
toward a least-common-denominator rule, individual parties are incentivized to cooperate with one 
another as much as possible.”). 
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Agreement117. 
Under such an approach, a multi-lateral treaty would take the place of 
organic legislation in the Federated Regulation structure described in 
Section A.118 This multi-lateral treaty would lay out aspirational goals of two 
forms. First, the common value of preventing privacy invasions from 
causing chilling effects establishes a baseline for drafting aspirational 
privacy goals. Second, these goals would be described in a common baseline 
set of positive enumerated privacy rights from the perspective of individual 
citizens. By focusing on positive (rather than negative) liberties, the need 
universally to define against which actors individuals must be protected is 
substantially reduced. 
Rather, the “feared actors” are defined individually at the national level. 
Here the nations themselves take the place of the regulated entities in 
adopting “compliance plans” through national legislation that implements at 
least the core values enumerated in a multi-lateral treaty. Each nation retains 
its sovereign freedom to determine against which actors those rights need 
most strongly to be enforced to prevent the common concern of chilling 
effects, and each nation likewise remains free to implement additional 
protections. 
This approach has appeal both for those who believe in the marketplace 
of ideas as best-equipped to resolve normative differences, as well as for 
those who believe that individual nations should retain sovereign power to 
make determinations affecting their own citizens' rights. By harmonizing 
compliance procedures, procedural-based transaction costs for 
organizations to operate in new jurisdictions are substantially reduced. 
While substantive-based transaction costs remain—such as an organization 
reassessing its information classification policy to accommodate a type of 
information protected as “sensitive” or “private” in a new nation, but not 
elsewhere—those transaction costs are exactly the types of costs the market 
should capture. Reducing procedural transaction costs shifts increased focus 
in market-participant decisions to substantive differences in privacy and data 
protection policies among nations, allowing the market to express global 
preferences regarding those policies. 
Unlike command-and-control regulatory models, however, such as air 
pollution control regulation,119 these policies respect the substantive choices 
of individual nations. By acknowledging the base levels of similarity 
described in Section II of this Article, the general and aspirational privacy 
goals articulated in a multi-lateral treaty would minimize imposition of base-
                                                                                                                          
117 See David Cole and Federico Fabbrini, Bridging the Transatlantic Divide? The United States, 
the European Union, and the Protection of Privacy Across Borders, 14 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 220, 220–
237 (2016). 
118 See supra Section III.A. 
119 Regulation 443/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 140) (providing emissions standards with sanctions for 
manufacturers that fail to meet them). 
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level substantive choices. While necessary to impose procedural and 
enforcement commonalities, such imposition under this flexible theoretical 
framework can provide substantial accommodation for substantive 
differences. While this approach does require accepting a functional and 
non-trivial distinction between procedural and substantive matters, in terms 
of the practicalities of privacy compliance procedures, such a distinction is 
not as challenging to accept as in other areas such as criminal justice.120  
There are additional benefits to this approach as well, particularly if the 
procedural compliance mechanism agreed upon by the nations also uses the 
Federated Regulation model. Similar to the legislative debate process, the 
requirement that regulated entities develop compliance plans brings the issue 
being regulated into the risk analysis conversation at the executive 
management level within organizations.121 Likewise, the Market-Supervised 
Regulatory Delegation model encourages similar debates in the national 
legislatures as they take steps to implement the general and aspirational 
goals required of them in the multi-lateral agreement. 
Interestingly, the E.U. already appears to be using a process similar to 
Federated Regulation for certain pieces of legislation, for example issuing a 
public consultation on mobile health regulation.122 
C. Federated Regulation for Standardizing Compliance by Regulated 
Entities 
The approach to harmonizing certain core values described in section B 
also suggests a process for privacy compliance that nations implementing 
the core values of the treaty can employ. The treaty could require that nations 
use a Federated Regulation approach, whereby whichever entities—public 
or private—each nation chose to limit the privacy invasions of would be 
required to develop compliance plans to achieve the specific privacy 
                                                                                                                          
120 Substance-procedure distinctions can be particularly challenging in the context of criminal 
justice. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Alabama, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016) (discussing the difficulties of 
distinguishing between procedural and substantive rules in criminal law and procedure); Miller v. 
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (same). This can be compared with the debated, but more readily accepted, 
distinction in U.S. administrative law, which recognizes the tension between but expressly requires 
distinction among procedural and substantive rules. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)(A) (exempting from 
rulemaking procedures “rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice) (emphasis added); see also 
Air Transp. Ass’n of America v. Dep’t of Transp., 900 F.2d 396 (D.C. Cir. 1990); JEM Broadcasting 
Co., Inc. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Gary Lawson, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 365–
375 (6th ed. 2013). 
121 Smith et al., supra note 51; see also Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, supra note 
57, at 367 (“The risk analysis and implementation details of information security are highly technical. It 
is nearly impossible for senior managers, charged with overseeing the operations of an entire 
organization, to maintain the knowledge necessary to correct their subordinates’ mistakes.”). 
122 Public Consultation on the Green Paper on Mobile Health, DIG. SINGLE MKT., 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/public-consultation-green-paper-mobile-health (last 
updated May 3, 2016, 2:45 PM). 
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protections laid out by that nation. 
Such an approach presents a substantial advantage for transnational 
organizations and transnational information flow. If the privacy compliance 
process is the same in all nations for an organization, while it still may need 
to vary some of the variables across nations—a non-trivial business cost—
a similar process substantially reduces compliance costs, particularly when 
the baseline for developing a privacy compliance plan begins with a 
common set of baseline criteria shared by all nations. 
Lastly, it is important to note that this analysis is not a panacea, nor does 
it address all privacy problems. As we discuss throughout this Article, one 
of the potential failings of previous attempts has been the effort to solve too 
many (irreconcilable) problems concurrently. As noted by Professor Peter 
Swire, both markets and governments are limited in their ability to address 
privacy concerns comprehensively, particularly as a function of the barriers 
consumers face to expressing privacy preferences in the market or 
politically.123 This proposal attempts to ease the burdens of expressing 
privacy protections at a macro-level, allowing nations to express preferences 
within a framework and letting the market sort out those preferences. It 
certainly is not an answer, but rather represents a possible move toward 
rethinking the structure of cross-border data flows in a manner which 
reduces procedural transaction costs and focuses market response more on 
substantive costs. 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
One of the greatest challenges in giving effect to international 
agreements is the general proposition in many nations that the head-of-state 
(in the U.S., the President) has the unilateral authority to negotiate—and 
often therefore re-negotiate—the foreign policy of the nation at will. In the 
United States, presidential power in foreign affairs is nearly plenary, with 
the only constitutional requirement for inter-branch involvement being 
ratification of Treaties (but not lesser agreements) by the U.S. Senate. 
As a practical matter, however, giving effect to international agreements 
in the United States often requires Congressional action beyond any required 
ratification.124 If the agreement involves financial appropriation, for 
example, Congressional action may be required. If the agreement involves 
domestic policy within the scope of the traditional Article I powers, 
Congressional action likewise may be required. 
Additionally, as noted above, the presidential power in U.S. foreign 
affairs nearly is plenary—and thus agreements are vulnerable to the shifting 
                                                                                                                          
123 Peter W. Swire, Markets, Self-Regulation, and Government Enforcement in the Protection of 
Personal Information 14–15 (1997), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=11472. 
124 See Margot E. Kaminski, The Capture of International Intellectual Property Law Through the 
U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 977, 1007 (2014) (describing how Congress has unilaterally 
withdrawn the U.S. from international agreements after declining to ratify them). 
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political winds of the current Executive. This is a particularly salient concern 
in an era which has seen such politically-sharp transitions as the U.S. 
Presidential elections of 2008 and 2016, both of which constituted electoral 
outcomes representing substantial shifts in foreign policy. 
Privacy, by contrast, is not a concept well-suited to frequent change. 
Individuals make decisions based on some reasonable degree of reliance that 
the choices they make regarding provision of information will not 
subsequently be undermined as a function of downstream changes in policy. 
Considering the volume of information shared globally in a modern 
information society, it is not reasonable to expect that individuals will have 
the ability to control and retract each information provision they previously 
made. Likewise, it is not reasonable to expect that organizations—
particularly for-profit private businesses—will have the capacity to build in 
the level of information density required to give effect to that level of version 
control.125 
Thus, any international agreement, whether formally a treaty under U.S. 
constitutional standards, should be backed by federal legislation. Such 
legislation not only should create a statutory framework to ensure 
implementation of the agreement, but also should create “speed bumps” to 
ensure that any future changes do not easily reverse the reliance created 
among organizations and individuals on privacy choices which are difficult 
to reverse with adequate precision once made. 
While this Article does not propose specific language for such action, 
we do provide a general framework sketch of one possible approach for 
implementing Federated Regulation to create a Market-Supervised 
Regulatory approach to U.S.-E.U. cross-border data flows. The core of such 
a framework would be a binding agreement between the U.S. and the E.U. 
which would include a set of basic positive assertions regarding definitions 
of sensitive information and data protection measures. Existing U.S. and 
E.U. laws do differ, in these respects, but the primary U.S. definitions of 
personally-identifiable information could serve as a definitional baseline of 
what is protected, and the primary E.U. requirements in the General Data 
Protection Regulation126 could serve as a baseline of the methods of 
protection. These would form minimal requirements, and would become part 
of the implementing statutory frameworks in both U.S. and E.U. 
implementing legislation. 
Building on this framework, which would allow for a basic degree of 
interoperability, a set of aspirational goals—areas to be addressed—could 
                                                                                                                          
125 To be clear, we do not argue that businesses should not be expected to provide customized 
privacy settings. This, as argued by many other privacy scholars, both is a reasonable expectation and 
likely is in the market interests of many private actors. Such customization is, however, a scientifically-
distinct concept from the highly-precise version control required to address the risks of unanticipated 
political change possible under contemporary approaches to foreign affairs. 
126 See generally Regulation 2016/679, supra note 40. 
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be defined as part of the international agreement. That agreement and the 
implementing statutes would then require each respective nation to consider 
those areas and decide—within its own political process—which additional 
protections (if any) to afford in the context of what data would be protected, 
to what degree, subject to what exceptions, and through what methods. 
The agreement and implementing legislation also would specify that 
compliance would be achieved through a common framework. Again 
borrowing from the concepts of Federated Regulation, the regulatory 
compliance goal for each entity would be to develop a plan which addressed 
both the general foundational areas as well as the “additional” areas of any 
nation in which the entity operated. While this would create additional 
transaction cost as a function of substantive protections, the transaction cost 
of operating in an additional nation would be minimal as a function of 
compliance cost, since the same methods of demonstrating compliance 
would apply.  
The goal here is not to achieve substantive convergence nor is it to 
reduce substantive compliance costs. Rather, it is to allow the function of 
the market and the political process to sort out which private protections 
apply. A regime of this nature would preclude a “race-to-the-bottom” as 
some argue currently occurs in the E.U., and likewise would close the “black 
hole” of the Safe Harbor/Privacy Shield. If a nation’s privacy protections 
become “too costly” and organizations elect not to conduct business there, 
that nation’s political process would be faced with the choice of revising 
their protections or losing access to international services. Likewise, nations 
no longer could serve as safe havens for lower privacy protections below 
what would ordinarily be demanded by the market or by political processes. 
CONCLUSION 
Privacy in cross-border data flows is one example of a larger problem. 
Much like the challenge of the radio spectrum, privacy of postal mail, 
wiretapping, and early Internet questions, over time societal and market 
developments will change the nature and scope of the problem. What will 
remain constant is the need for theoretical frames through which 
policymakers can develop regulatory frameworks for dealing with rapidly 
changing technology. The historical examples listed above, and many others 
discussed in related jurisprudence and scholarship both in the U.S. and the 
E.U., demonstrate well the accelerating trend of technological change 
outpacing legal and policy processes. 
This outpacing is not inherently evil, as the law does (and arguably 
should) respond carefully, contemplatively, and with care—all things to 
which speed is anathema. Yet rapidly-developing technology remains. What 
then must a society do? This Article presents the concept of Market-
Supervised Regulatory Delegation as a method of allowing policymaking to 
embrace the market—which will continue to develop regardless of the speed 
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at which the law responds—and rather than distorting market outcomes, seek 
to enhance the degree to which the market expresses preferences across 
nations with differing normative priors but where the question at issue is 
inherently internetworked, and therefore international.  
Stated far more simply—this proposal allows the market to function, 
preserves national sovereignty, without sacrificing the benefits of 
international trade. We hope others will critically examine, critique, build 
upon, and improve it as a potential approach for international regulation of 
complex, rapidly-changing technological markets. 
Finally, we note that in the specific context of privacy and cross-border 
data flows, this Article is exploratory and seeks to lay out a theoretical 
framework. That framework considers whether it is possible to harmonize 
the process of privacy compliance in different regimes without having to 
reach agreement on all aspects of the substance of that regulation. Such a 
distinction does not ignore the well-established debate over whether 
procedural and substantive rules can be differentiated, but rather elects the 
assumption that they can and explores whether doing so may yield fruit to 
improve a currently undesirable and inefficient regulatory outcome. We 
recognize that this proposal is far from a policy directive, but hope that its 
framework encourages policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic to 
consider new perspectives both on what should be the goals of cross-border 
data flow policy and what styles of regulatory frameworks can be employed 
to achieve those goals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

